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Abstract
Most of crises, environmental, humanitarian,
economic or even social, occur after different
presaging signals that permit to trigger warnings.
These warnings can help to prevent damages and
harm if they are issued timely and provide
information that helps responders and population to
adequately prepare for the disaster to come. Today,
there are many systems based on Information and
Communication Technologies that are designed to
recognize foreboding signals of crises to limit their
consequences. Warning system are part of them, they
have proved to be effective, but as for all systems
including human beings, a part of unpredictable
remains. In this article, we provide a method of data
analysis that allows decision makers in crisis cells to
have answer elements to the question of alerting or
not populations in a given geographical area. This
method is based on a selection of factors that
influence population behaviors, for which we
establish a list of relevant indicators that can be
informed in the preliminary phase of a crisis into
warning systems. From these indicators, we propose
a tool for decision support (based on a decision tree
as a possible representation).

1. Introduction
The insertion in computer systems of cognitive
elements and simulation of realistic human behaviors
to reproduce or predict events or actions is a
challenge for developers. Understanding human
behavior so that it can be integrated into
computerized systems is still a challenge, requiring
the interconnection of heterogeneous elements that
can be physiological, psychological, social or
environmental. Today, thanks to advances in data
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management, it is faster and more efficient to manage
real time data, make maps from geolocalized data or
make assessments based on scenarios that integrate
data from different sources. These evolutions enabled
to improve crisis management systems, developed to
support those who respond to disasters. Indeed, a lot
of important decisions have to be taken before and
during crises. They are based on objective data and
information but are also determined by subjective
elements such as cognitive biases that can limit the
effectiveness of the response. A manner to limit the
effect of cognitive biases is to improve the
completeness of information in crisis management
systems. Crisis management systems help in
particular to predict as precisely and as soon as
possible the consequences of a crisis and its evolution
in a given territory. They allow to take into account
more and more complex information. Indeed, crisis
management systems integrate data from different
sources and natures to predict as finely as possible
and in advance the emergence, the flow of a crisis
and its consequences on a given territory. Despite
knowledge and technologies developed in order to
minimize or avoid disastrous consequences that a
crisis can produce, crises remain, partly, determined
by uncertain phenomena, which are not always
considered in these crisis management systems. The
vulnerability of territories, the need for coordination
among services, and the probable behaviors of
populations-in-danger, for example, are sometimes
neglected [1].
Before and after a crisis, people act according to
their own knowledge and interpretation schemes.
These schemes do not always allow people to react in
an appropriate way to risky situations and can lead to
dangerous reactions [2]. ICTs are a key element in
these warning systems, they help to guide the
behavior of individuals when a crisis is announced by
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providing them knowledge before the crisis, and by
guiding them in the interpretation of the signals
perceived during the crisis. Several actors gravitate
around these warning systems with different roles.
The main actors are the crisis management specialists
and experts who build models and help fueling the
warning system, the decision-makers who act for the
resolution of crisis, the actors of the field who apply
the decisions taken in the crisis cell and finally the
populations. This article will only focus on the last
category of actors, the populations, by offering an
analysis based on their behavior during a crisis.
Taking into account the laws and phenomena
governing behavior in crisis situation seems to us an
important axis of research and reflection on the
improvement of the alert/warning diffusion, the crisis
communication and on the development of policies of
education and targeted outreach. Indeed, many
recommendations advocate referring warning
systems to more human-centered aspects, mainly
through the participation of populations in decisionmaking processes [3]. It seems to us complementary
to this approach to integrate these human-centered
aspects in the knowledge of the risk and in the
sensitization made through the knowledge of its
behaviors.
Thus, in order to improve the adaptation of
warning systems to the populations concerned, we
propose in this article a method to help decisionmakers (often in a crisis cell) to determine whether or
not they should alert people according to their likely
behaviors. Warning populations can help to cope
with a crisis by protecting the populations, but it can
also constitute a threat and have more harmful effects
than those of the crisis. On November 13, 2015,
during the attacks in Paris, the President of the
Republic decided not to evacuate the Stade de France
for example, to avoid crowd movements with new
dangerous consequences.
At first, we define here the main concepts related
to our proposal, via a state of the art. We then
propose our decision support process to determine
whether populations need to be alerted to their likely
behaviors. We then apply our approach to real cases
in order to validate its feasibility. Finally we
conclude and give some research perspectives.

2. Related works
The reactions of the populations have a major
impact on the resolution of a crisis. One of the
challenges of early warning systems is to take into
account the natural reactions of the people affected

by the crisis to make them evolving upstream of the
crisis, to anticipate them, and to correct them if
necessary during and after the crisis.

2.1. Early warning systems
Natural disasters are a constant cause of human
suffering and economic loss around the world.
Climate change and rapid urbanization only
aggravate the problem. For upstream contingency
plans to be as effective as possible, it is vital to have
an early warning system. Early-warning is the
provision of timely and effective information that
allows organizations and individuals to take action to
avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for effective
response [4]. It should be noted that an early warning
system is specific to a type of environment but also to
the environment for which it has been set up
(geographical area, political decisions, etc.).
Therefore, there are no two identical systems.
A complete and effective EWS comprises four
elements [3]:
- Risk knowledge: knowledge of the relevant
hazard and vulnerability;
- Monitoring and warning service: technical
capacities to constantly monitor hazard
precursors, prediction of potential risks and
warning issue;
- Dissemination
and
communication:
dissemination of understandable warnings with
prior preparedness information;
- Response capability: knowledge of risks,
warning services plans and appropriate actions
for persons at risk.
In this sequential list, each element has two direct
links and interactions with each of the other elements.
Failure of any part of the system will imply failure of
the whole system. Human factor in particular plays a
significant and transversal role in all steps [5, 6].
We consider in this paper, according to [7], that
an early warning system is a "Chain of information
communication
systems
comprising
sensor,
detection, decision, and broker-subsystems, in the
given order, working in conjunction, forecasting and
signaling disturbances adversely acting the stability
of the physical world; and giving sufficient time for
the response system to prepare resources and
response actions to minimize the impact on the
stability of the physical world".
Thus, an early warning system is a set of tools for
predicting hazards [8, 9]. Understanding and
responding adequately to early warning signals
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before they manifest themselves and turn into acute
needs is in many cases more effective than
responding only after the disaster has occurred.
Ideally, early warning signals should trigger
appropriate actions to alert the population of the
danger. Alerts and decisions to evacuate the
population; deploy disaster relief teams in a
city/region; or pre-position goods, are the interface
between preparation and response. The sooner an
alert is issued, the more time it takes to trigger these
actions. However, the information on the danger is
often not very precise in the preliminary phase of a
crisis, it becomes more and more precise only as the
time passes (likewise, the threat becomes more and
more concrete). Before deciding on the actions to be
taken, the decision-makers seek to obtain the most
precise information possible on the event, what are
the possible actions and the necessary resources.
In addition to this information, we propose to
integrate the characteristics of the population that can
have an impact on their reactions to the alert and to
the crisis itself.

2.2. Population and Behaviors
The behavior concept needs to be clarified and
well defined, since it can be approached very
differently in the scientific sphere. Some speak of
"nomadic" concept that can take several meanings
according to the disciplines [10]. In philosophy, for
example, definitions rest on the notions of conscience
and experiences [11], although in cognitive sciences
it can be approached as a logical suite of actions [12].
The most important works on the subject are
provided by human sciences, notably in ethology and
in psychology domains [13, 14]. In this paper we take
up the definition of [15] for whom the behavior
corresponds to the "reactions of a person, considered
in a milieu and in a given time unit to an excitation or
a set of stimulation". Human behavior is also
integrated in artificial intelligence research whose
idea is to transport knowledge elements in a virtual
reality and to provide reasoning for the treatment of
these elements. Applications of artificial intelligence,
for example, enable virtual agents to make strategic
choices. We find these kinds of research in domains
such as automatic production of explanations or
solving mathematical problems [16], but it is still
difficult today to integrate cognitive dimensions of
behaviors to these computer science representations.
Individual behaviors in crisis situations do not
correspond to everyday life behaviors. It is difficult
to represent these behaviors from the information that
has been obtained after a crisis, as this information is

always static, punctual and contextual. This causes
difficulties to integrate the great diversity of human
reactions that can appear in crisis situations. We can
however work to establish tendencies, or correlations
on factors that orient particular behaviors.
This information nevertheless makes it possible to
cite some types of behavior frequently observed in
crisis situations [17]: evacuation, flight; panic escape;
stupidity, stupefaction; immobility; confinement,
sheltering; fight against the effects of the disaster;
search for relatives; assistance, emergency relief; socalled "antisocial" behavior; curiosity; return to the
place of residence, of work.
There are three types of behaviors: (i) reflex or
instinctive behaviors that allow rapid action through
struggle, stun or flight, (ii) panic behaviors, emerging
crowd phenomena via imitation mechanisms or
contagion and (iii) controlled behaviors that are
reasoned reactions [18].
It is important to take into account a maximum of
elements to study the behaviors in crisis situation;
two events which seem similar can bring very
different reactions. Between the tsunami that
occurred in Fukushima on March 11, 2011 and the
one that occurred five years later, on November 22,
2016, the reactions of the authorities and the
inhabitants evolved in a very significant way. In
2016, the Prime Minister ordered the government to
warn the public with accurate and reliable
information on evacuation procedures and calls to
evacuate were much more numerous. Reactions in
general were greatly influenced by the lived
experience five years ago. Emotions such as fear or
surprise can also have a strong influence on crowd
movements, as it was the case after the football
match on June 3, 2017 in Turin following a bomb
attack rumor.

2.3. Decision support in crisis management
In France, protection against accidents and
disasters is a function of the State. This role is
provided by the civil safety teams, which rests on
different specialist services who act for civil safety,
firefighters, military units of training and
intervention, pilots of aircraft and helicopters as well
as mine-clearing experts. Their roles are directed by
the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Civile et de la
Gestion des Crises (General Direction of the Civil
Safety and of the Crisis Management) under the
direction of the Ministry of the Interior. They define
particularly the missions of evaluation, preparation,
coordination and application of protection, the
information and warning systems for populations, the
prevention of civil risks of all types, and the planning
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of civil security measures. This organization rests on
the 101 prefectures present on the French territory.

2.3.1. The decision in a crisis cell
The urgency of a crisis situation requires that
decisions leading to its resolution be quick and
effective [19]. In a crisis cell, decisions are
conditioned by high uncertainties, a high number of
stakeholders, extremely short or relatively long
durations, communication problems, and important
issues far beyond the immediate operational aspects
[20]. Whether or not they are part of safeguarding
plans, many decisions need to be made. These
decisions are generally made collectively and focus
on the choice of the actions to be carried out and the
resources allocated to these actions. Decisions are
made by a multiplicity of stakeholders, which can
create difficulties in finding common ground for all
stakeholders. Decisions do not always make
consensus. Thus, tools to help making decisions are
needed.

2.3.2. Tools available to decision-makers
The simplest tools are often the most used in crisis
management. They are used for different purposes
during the prodromal phase of a crisis, for
prospective analysis activities by analyzing the multidomain
consequences
following
different
assumptions, situation analysis and planning
activities.
Decision-makers have at their disposal descriptive
models (Tables, Geographical Information Systems,
Ontologies …) and models of decision support.
There are many specific models dedicated to
decision support for a type of crisis in a given
territory, but few generic models have been proposed
in the literature, but we should mention: Avoidance
model [21], Generic model of Nioche [22], Sayech
Model [23], and Meta-ontology of the ISyCri project
[24]. On the other hand, there are decision support
models that are not specific to crisis management,
such as (multicriteria) decision support models,
recommender systems or predictive models derived
from Machine Learning. The latter two require large
volumes of data to learn the model and verify its
applicability. In crisis management, such a volume of
data relating to many "similar" crises is currently
non-existent. We have therefore turned to decision
support models that have the ability to work with
small datasets and, in addition, allow for some
explanations of the proposed decisions.

Finally, to make information accessible to
decision-makers who are not computer scientists but
who make decisions with major issues, a possibility
is to use decision trees [25] that have the specificity
of representing a set of choices, in the graphic form
of a tree. The different possible decisions are located
at the ends of the branches (the "leaves" of the tree),
and are reached according to decisions made at each
stage. The decision tree is a tool used in various
fields such as security, data mining, medicine, etc. It
has the advantage of being easy to read and quick to
execute [25].

3. Our decision support process
Many factors can influence the decision to alert
people about the threat of a future crisis. We can cite
the level of risk, the warning devices or the material
and human resources that can be deployed in the
area, but also factors that are more difficult to
anticipate, such as the behaviors of the populations:
the way the populations respond to the alert can have
a positive or negative impact on the consequences of
the crisis. The decision to alert, itself, can have an
influence on major issues, particularly the economic
stake with the shutdown of the activity at the time of
the alert, and the political stake: alert may have
impacts on people's perception of their level of
security or of the authorities' ability to protect them.
The decision to alert or not the populations is
generally taken by a group of decision-makers
present in the crisis cell; it is based on information
elements which were collected on the nature of the
crisis (potential or certain), on its potential impacts,
and the human appreciation based on the experience
of those present. It is therefore based on both
objective and subjective elements, but it has been
shown that the decisions made by the decisionmakers, whether in the pre-crisis phase (latency
phase), during the response period or during the postcrisis phase are subject to cognitive biases that may
influence them in a way that is contrary to rationality
and effectiveness of the response to the various issues
of these three phases [26]. It is therefore important to
offer decision-makers assistance in their analysis of
the situation. We propose our process of decision
support to alert or not the populations, according to
the behaviors that may be observed in response to the
alert.
We present our contribution through the creation
of a process for the construction of a decision support
tool. This approach aims to help decision-makers in
the prodromal phase of a crisis to identify the
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Figure 1: Our decision support process

warning zones and the means to implement, as well
as the information to be disseminated. It is based on
explicit knowledge, relating to the behavior of
populations in case of alert or crisis. We therefore
propose an approach for the design of a structured
decision support tool in four steps: (1) Data
collection from heterogeneous sources, (2) indicators
selection and aggregation, (3) analysis based on a
decision-making model and (4) results interpretation
(Figure 1).
The aim is to provide a systemic view of the
behavior of populations in crisis, to provide an
indication of the likely behavior of a population in
response to an alert for a crisis announced in a given
city.

perform this analysis, as this type of model allows an
easily understandable reading of the results for the
decision-maker. One possible representation, among
others, would be a decision tree.

The first step in the process is to build a
knowledge base on past crises. This database will be
a collection of data from heterogeneous sources
obtained from research on social networks, field
surveys based on questionnaires, vulnerability
studies, weak signal sensors or individual and
collective motion sensors, and search on the web.
The data collected correspond, among others, to the
behavioral factors as well as to the actual behavior of
the populations during the crisis.

Step 1: (Heterogeneous) data collection

From the data collected in the first step, we
determine a second step of indicator selection and
aggregation to obtain a new set of indicators that are
as independent as possible from each other. The
selection is obtained from interviews with experts
and decision-makers or from algorithms.
The third step is to use this new set of indicators
to analyze data on population behavior factors to
determine actual behaviors for a given crisis. We
choose to use algorithms to generate decision rules to

Finally, the last step is for the decision-maker to
interpret the results to make a decision, identify any
inconsistencies or erroneous rules based on examples
of situations.

4. Applications to real cases
In this section, we apply our decision support
process to real cases.

The case studies were selected from the accidents
listed in the ARIA database (analysis, research and
information on accidents) which lists more than
46000 accidents occurred mainly in France but also
abroad. The accidents involved are the result of
industrial activities, the transport of hazardous
materials, the distribution and use of gas, pressure
equipment, underground mines and storage facilities,
and dikes and dams. This database is developed by
the Ministry of Ecological and Solidarity Transition.
It is available free of charge on the website
www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr. The 9 case
studies that we selected stem from events that
occurred in France between 1981 and 2013 and had
human and social consequences of 5 or 6 on the
European scale of accidents, ranging from 0 to 6.
This scale created in 1994 for the application of the
SEVESO directive (on the control of major-accident
hazards involving dangerous substances) is based on
18 technical parameters intended to characterize the
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Table 1: Population behavior factors and indicators

effects or consequences of accidents. Each of these
parameters has 6 levels. In France, the European
scale is represented according to 4 indices including
human and social consequences which take for
example the total number of deaths, wounded with
hospitalization superior to 24h, residents evacuated or
confined to their homes, deprived of potable water…

We have collected some data in the ARIA database.
The rest of the data has been obtained from various
databases made available on institutional sites and
from newspaper archives:
• www.georisques.gouv.fr for the existence of
risk prevention plans;
• carto.observatoire-des-territoires.gouv.fr for
demographic indicators ;
• www.insee.fr for nationality data;
• www.meteofrance.com for meteorological
data;
• Local
and
national
newspapers:
www.nouvelobs.com,
www.ladepeche.fr,
www.lemonde.fr...

Step 2: Indicator selection and aggregation
In [27] we proposed different factors and
indicators that allow us to integrate knowledge about
the behavior of populations into warning systems.
These 20 factors and 74 indicators are intended,
through their analysis, to shed light on decisions that
may affect populations.

These different factors are presented separately from
one to another, in Table 1, but it is important to note
the strong dependency between some indicators that
compose them and between the factors themselves.
In the remainder of this study, we limit ourselves
to the indicators that were readily available in the
data sources at our disposal, namely, age, sex,
population density, and time of day. Due to the low
number of accessible indicators, we do not aggregate
them.
Step 3: Analysis and Decision model
With the aim of providing a systemic view of the
behavior of populations in crisis situations (which
can be useful for improving risk knowledge, the
selection of relevant indicators to be monitored
during the prodromal phase of a crisis, the issuance
of alerts and awareness of populations), we propose a
(static) process, based on decision tree. Indeed, as
indicated in section 2.3.2, a decision tree has the
advantage of being easy to read and quick to execute.
There are many algorithms for generating
decision trees. The two most known and used [28]
are C4.5 and Random Tree. C4.5 builds decision
trees from a set of training data using the concept of
information entropy [29]. Random Tree is a
supervised classifier; it is an ensemble learning
algorithm that generates many individual learners. It
employs a bagging idea to produce a random set of
data for constructing a decision tree. In standard tree
each node is split using the best split among all
variables [30].
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Figure 2: Decision tree obtained with the algorithm J48-C4.5
Pruned Tree
We therefore used these two algorithms,
implemented in the Weka1 software, to analyze our
data (C4.5 is implemented as J48). Finally, it should
be noted that these algorithms need possible
decisions (classes) as input data and then seek to
determine a classification of elements according to
the initial classes. From the data sources at our
disposal, the possible decisions/classes we have
identified are: panic, rumors, panic_and_rumors,
nothingness (no reaction of panic or rumor).
Table 2 and Figures 2 and 3 show the obtained results
with the 9 instances and 14 attributes we have.
Our 9 instances correspond to accidents/crises that
took place in French cities: Lyon (2008), Rouen
(2013), Nemours (2005), Villeurbanne (1981),
Béziers (2005), Dagneux (2007), Saint-Galmier
(2000), Saint-Just-Saint-Rambert (2005), Montoir-deBretagne (2002).
The 14 attributes used in our study are:
• Visual signals,
• Sound signals,
• Olfactory signals,
• Population density,
• Type of urbanism,
• Moment of the day,
• Number of foreigners,
• Panic or rumors,
• Part of under 15s (%),
• 75 years and over (%),
• Weather,
• Male/female ratio,
• Number of accidents in the city,

1

www.weka.fr

•

The city is located within the perimeter of a
PPRT (technological risk prevention plan)

Table 2: Summary table of the classification (J48C4.5 and Random Tree)
J48 – C4.5
Random Tree
#Instances
9
9
#Attributes
14
14
Correctly Classified
8 (88.89 %)
9 (100 %)
Instances
Incorrectly Classified
1 (11.11 %)
0 (0 %)
Instances
Kappa statistic2
0.83
1
MAE3
0.08
0.03
RMSE4
0.21
0.08
RAE5
25.06 %
9.74 %
RRSE6
50.51 %
20.12 %
Size of the tree
5
12

2

Cohen's kappa coefficient is a statistic which
measures inter-rater agreement for qualitative
(categorical) items, its value is in [0, 1]. The higher
the value, the better the results.
3
Mean Absolute Error: The smaller the value, the
better the results.
4
Root Mean Squared Error: The smaller the value,
the better the results.
5
Relative Absolute Error: The smaller the value, the
better the results
6
Root Relative Squared Error: The smaller the value,
the better the results
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Figure 3: Decision tree obtained with the algorithm Random Tree

Step 4: Results interpretation
The results, presented in the form of decision
tables, have the objective to aid decision-makers to
evaluate the relevance of alerting the populations by
identifying the risks of rumors and panic. They give
indications to target the populations thanks to the
designation of categories that are more sensible to
rumors and panic behaviors.
According to Table 2, we observe that the
Random Tree algorithm, based on a random set of
indicators selected to represent the decision nodes,
offers better performances than the C4.5 algorithm,
which uses an entropy function to select the decision
nodes. Indeed, with Random Tree, the instances are
better ranked (100% against 88.89% for C4.5), the
Kappa test has a value of 1 (which is the maximum
achievable value), the values of MAE and RMSE are
the smallest (> 0.08) and RAE and RRSE are
significantly better than C4.5.
The set of rules that emerge from the construction
of the decision trees of these two algorithms have the
advantage of being easily interpretable by those
interested.
According to Figure 2 (C4.5), the decision nodes
are identified and make it possible to discriminate
between the different categories of the class attribute
(here called ratio-man-woman). We can thus classify
from this tree (Figure 2) a crisis situation in a city for
which the part of the under 15s is greater than 15.3
and the ratio male/female greater than 1.11 as a
situation where the risk “panic and rumors” is high.

According to Figure 3 (Random Tree), we observe
that more information is accessible (more
intermediate classes exist, unlike Figure 2). Thus, the
decision-maker has more leeway in his decision. It
should be noted that we find close decisions in the
two trees, for example, when the part of the under
15s is higher than a certain threshold (rather low),
then the risk "Nothingness" is more likely.
Finally, these preliminary results are to be taken
with a pinch of salt. Indeed, the data at our disposal
are not sufficient for the algorithms to provide
realistic decision trees. The purpose of this article and
the experiments carried out is to show the feasibility
of our approach. It would take hundreds of instances
and more indicators to begin to have
consistent/realistic results.

5. Conclusion and Future Work
Early warning systems are very strongly linked to
the actions of the individuals who constitute them.
The reactions of the populations in particular can
have a great importance in the effectiveness of the
alert and the effects can be felt in the long term. This
is why we propose in this article a decision support
process to alert or not the populations in a crisis
situation.
In order to validate the feasibility of our approach,
we applied it to real data by proposing a decision tree
for the decision-makers in a crisis cell and thus help
them to determine whether to alert the population or
not.
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As future work, our approach will have to be
validated by a cross analysis between risk experts on
different domains. It will be necessary to identify the
precise characteristics of the alert and the response
according to the typology of the crises so that the
different factors/indicators and decisions can be
appropriately selected. Care must be taken to work on
the recovery of data from different sources in a tool
that can be integrated into a crisis cell.
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